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Abstract
Empirical research on the e®ect of monetary policy in open economies faces several abnor-
malities like \liquidity puzzle", \price puzzle" and \exchange rate puzzle". In this paper, a
new monetary policy tool { the spread between the Central Bank's interbank interest rate and
the depreciation of the domestic currency { is introduced to address these three abnormalities
within a highly in°ationary small open economy setting. A recursive system is used to identify
monetary policy shocks and to assess the e®ect of these shocks on the economy. Our empiri-
cal evidence from Turkey suggests that tight monetary policy is associated with a decrease in
income and prices and the appreciation of the currency in the short run. For prices and the
exchange rate, the e®ect is permanent; but for income the e®ect is transitory.
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JEL codes: E50, E52 and E43.1 Introduction
There has been great deal of work on developing monetary models of business cycles. There
have also been extensive studies on constructing the empirical measure of exogenous monetary
policy shocks. Most of these studies perform their analysis for developed countries (see Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999 and references cited therein). However, central bankers of developing
countries, while also small and open economies, face additional challenges. Two of these challenges
are related: the problem of currency substitution and the central bank's incentive to monitor its
foreign exchange reserves closely. Therefore, construction of a model for developing countries may
di®er from the ones of developed countries. On currency substitution, the public may avoid using
domestic currency, preferring foreign currency to guard themselves against in°ation. Agents like to
hold more of their wealth in foreign currency than in domestic currency if the interest rate is lower
or the depreciation of the domestic currency is higher. On the level of foreign exchange reserves,
the central bank also closely monitor its foreign exchange reserves eliminating either the risk of
speculative attack or the balance of payment crisis. Reserves also increase as the domestic interest
rate increases (due to either capital in°ow or the decreasing foreign exchange demand of domestic
residents) and decrease as the return on the foreign exchange increases. Hence, this paper uses a
new measure to monitor monetary policy when the interest rate and the exchange rate are used
simultaneously. In particular, this paper argues that the extend to which interbank interest rate
exceeds the depreciation rate of the local currency (spread) can be used as an indicator of the stance
of a central bank's monetary policy. Using spread as an indicator of a central bank's monetary
policy does not mean that the central bank controls both of these instruments simultaneously, but
rather the central bank may control one of the two and merely watch the other. However, even in
this case, spread might be used as an indicator of monetary policy. This measure is also robust
in the case of central bank's switching between pure exchange rate targeting and interest rate
targeting. Here, the central bank may cut the liquidity provided to the public by raising interest
rates at a given level of depreciation rate, or it may keep domestic interest rates stable and buy
Turkish lira (TL) from the public by selling foreign currency at a lower rate.
1Measuring the stance of monetary policy is not an easy task. If the monetary policy is reacting
to the state of the economy, then it is unlikely to in°uence the economic performance in the current
period. However, the part of the monetary policy that is exogenous (the part that does not respond
to the state of the economy) is likely to in°uence the economic performance. In order to identify
the exogenous monetary policy, disturbances are important. Recent research has used two well
known paths to identify these exogenous monetary policy disturbances: monetary aggregates and
interest rates. However, each of these paths has its own problems. The ¯rst problem is that the
empirical evidence suggests that innovation in monetary aggregates is associated with rising (rather
than decreasing) interest rates { liquidity puzzle (Leeper and Gordon, 1992).
The second problem is that once interest rate measure is integrated into the speci¯cation,
monetary aggregates no longer cause output in Granger's sense (Sims, 1980 and Litterman and
Weiss, 1985). This encouraged Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992) to use the innovation
in interest rate as a measure of monetary policy change. However, this created additional challenges.
When the tight monetary policy is identi¯ed with positive interest rate innovations, it seems that
prices increase rather than decrease { price puzzle (Leeper and Gordon, 1992, and Sims, 1992). Sims
(1992), Sims and Zha (1996) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996a) suggest including
commodity prices to account for this puzzle. The third puzzle suggests that positive innovation in
interest rates is associated with impact depreciation of the local currency rather than appreciation
{ exchange rate puzzle (Sims, 1992, and Grilli and Roubini, 1995).
This paper uses Turkish monthly data from 1986:05 to 2000:101 to show that tight monetary
policy is associated with the decrease in income and prices, and the appreciation of the domestic
currency, showing its e®ect within two months, but the e®ect of monetary policy is not persistent
for income. Turkey o®ers a unique environment for assessing the stance of the monetary policy.
First, Turkey has been experiencing a high and persistent level of in°ation without running into
hyperin°ation since the mid-1970s (the average annual in°ation is 52.3% for the period between
1975 and 2000, and 61.6% for the period that is considered in this study). This allows us to assess
relationships between money aggregates and macroeconomic variables easier than would otherwise
be detected. Second, the Central Bank is actively involved in monetary policy setting most of the
sample period considered either by in°uencing interbank interest rates or by setting the exchange
rate. Third, Turkey has relatively well developed and liberal ¯nancial markets especially money,
foreign exchange and bond markets without any heavy regulations that prevent the proper working
1The data set is ended in 2000:10 to avoid the beginning of a period that that has a series of ¯nancial crises
starting with November 22, 2000 and continuing with February 22, 2001, July 7, 2001 and September 11, 2001
2of the market mechanism for the sample period under consideration. All these allow us to assess the
e®ect of monetary policy and the economic outcomes associated with it. The next section discusses
the operating procedures of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Section 3 deals with the
identi¯cation of the model. Section 4 discusses the identi¯cation of the monetary policy and the
last section is the conclusion.
2 Operation of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
Every morning the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) announces the exchange rate
for a set of currencies to buy and sell with a close margin and the discount window for Turkish lira
to commercial banks with a wide margin for the period that this paper considers. In May 1981,
CBRT adopted the crawling peg exchange rate regime in which the exchange rates of TL are set
daily. In February 1990, Turkey applied to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the full
convertibility of TL. In its 1993 annual report, the IMF identi¯ed the exchange rate regime of the
CBRT as \Turkey follows a °exible exchange rate policy under which the exchange rate for the
Turkish lira against the U.S. dollar is determined in daily ¯xing sessions held at the Central Bank."
With the adaptation of the Year 2000 Disin°ation Program, the CBRT announced a predetermined
daily exchange rate path on a sliding 12-month horizon. This is the policy implemented for the
sample that we consider till February 22, 2001 when CBRT let the exchange rate be determined
by the market and allowed the depreciation of the domestic currency on the same day by 61%.
The Central Bank also hosts the interbank market where commercial banks can trade Turkish
liras with overnight and overweek options. Moreover, the CBRT can also engage in open market
operations. The daily depreciation of the exchange rate for the whole month does not change much
within any given month, whereas the interbank interest rate may °uctuate widely. Commercial
banks and the public could be holding foreign currency in preference to TL. If the public sees that
the return of TL (interbank interest rate) exceeds the return of foreign currency (depreciation),
then they have incentive to hold Turkish liras. If the public sees that the return of money decreases
relative to depreciation of the foreign currency, then they have incentive to hold foreign currency. In
the 1990s, the Central Bank showed no major weakness in regard to the foreign exchange reserves
it used. Therefore, the CBRT could use its foreign exchange reserves as a tool to determine its
monetary policy. In the ¯rst half of the 1990s, the CBRT followed the guidelines of a policy to issue
Turkish liras parallel to the increase in its foreign exchange positions, being aware of the ¯nancing
needs of the public sector. In this regard, one of the constraints of the CBRT was to stabilize
3the value of the TL against foreign currencies and to eliminate any potential attack on foreign
exchange reserves. As stated by the Governor in his speech on January 28, 1997; \ ...we aimed
to have the depreciation rate of TL follow a stable path and to keep the level of foreign exchange
reserves constant." Also it was stated by the governor in various speeches that the CBRT actively
used the Open Market Operation tool in reducing the volume of TL which was issued as the result
of foreign exchange reserve accumulation. Here, the CBRT could be using both of these instruments
simultaneously in Pool (1970) sense, or the CBRT could set either of those instruments by watching
the other. The role of depreciation the CBRT attributed to this development became more formal
by the beginning of the year 1996 as the Governor of the CBRT once publicly announced this
proposition that
\... the exchange rate basket (1 US dollar and 1,5 Deutsche marks) will be increased
steadily and in parallel with the in°ation rate. The stability of exchange rate policy
enables the market to have a clear view of the increase in the monthly exchange rate
basket by following the rates announced for surrender requirements. This o®ers the
markets a parameter to help them shape their expectations accurately. In short, the
exchange rate basket and the interest rates which are determined in accordance with
this basket provide an important packet of information concerning the equilibrium of the
nominal variables in the economy." Gazi Er» cel April 1, 1998.
Therefore, it can be argued that the Central Bank may increase the interbank interest rate
relative to the depreciation rate in order to tighten the monetary policy. The Central Bank may
decrease the interbank interest rate relative to the depreciation rate to loosen its monetary policy
stance. Moreover, for the period that we consider in this paper, except for April of 1994 when Turkey
experienced a self-in°icted ¯nancial crisis, the CBRT depreciated the local currency (against the
basket) by the same amount for each day for each given month { that is even if the local currency
could depreciate by the same rate each day, the monthly depreciation rate might change from one
month to another. The public could foresee the depreciation rate for each month after the ¯rst 2-3
business days of each given month. Hence, this suggests that at a given date, spread is a®ected by
the exchange rate but the exchange rate does not a®ect the spread.
In this paper, we used interest spread as an indicator of monetary policy. To measure the
monetary policy of the CBRT, some of its balance sheet items could be used. The CBRT has
announced its monetary program at various times in the past. The very ¯rst program that they
announced was for the year 1990, when the CBRT limited credit to the public sector. In the
4beginning of 1998, the CBRT announced its Reserve Money target; and after the second half of
1998, the CBRT announced its Net Domestic Asset target. There were some problems with these
targets. Limiting credit to the public sector did not mean that the resources of the CBRT not
used to ¯nance the public sector. The ¯nancing continued indirectly since the government forced
government owned banks to give credit to the public sector at a lower than market interest rate.
Public banks could ¯nance themselves from the CBRT or ¯nancing of Treasury was realized by
means of CBRT's extending funds to the banking system through the open market as was the case
in 1999 (this was one of the reasons for the February 22, 2001 ¯nancial crisis (see, Uygur, 2001).
Even though the CBRT announced its Reserve Money target for the ¯rst six months of 1998,
it claimed that forecasting Reserve Money Demand was di±cult under variable in°ation (espe-
cially when the level of in°ation had been decreasing). The Governor announced that \... Another
important issue (with respect to reserve money) is that during disin°ation, estimating the rate of
re-monetization of an economy following period of high in°ation is very di±cult. Policy simula-
tions with regard to money demand applications implicitly assumes that de-monetization and re-
monetization are systematic process. However in practice these elasticities are not same". Hence,
monetary aggregates are not measured as targets to control in°ation.
Hence, CBRT switched to Net Domestic Asset (NDA) targeting in June 1998. This variable was
only available after the second half of 1998 for both policy makers and the public. The Governor of
the CBRT publicly claimed that this target had been announced to give credibility to the monetary
policy of the CBRT and the CBRT would not monetize the government debt (Monetary Program:
December 9, 1999). More importantly, the Governor publicly declared that the CBRT cared more
about the interest rate than NDA target and they did not even need to announce the NDA target
to set up monetary policy (Yeni YÄ uzy³l: August 10, 1998). Therefore, innovation in NDA is not
used as an indicator of monetary policy in this paper.
3 The Identi¯cation of The Model
The identi¯cation of the e®ect of the monetary policy is not a simple task. The reason for this is
that the action of the Central Bank also depends on both the state of the economy and the intention
of the Central Bank for the setting up the monetary policy. In order to isolate the e®ect of Central
Banks' policy activities per se, identi¯cation of the components of the Central Banks' policy that
are not reactive to other variables is crucial. In order to solve this identi¯cation problem, some
assumptions are required and those assumptions will be discussed below.
5The monetary policy shocks will be identi¯ed with the error terms in the regression equation
speci¯ed as
St = f(­t)+"st (1)
where St is the policy instrument, ­t is the information set available to the Central Bank at time
t, f(:) is a linear function, "st is the monetary policy shock which is uncorrelated and orthogonal
to each element of ­t. In order to justify the "st as exogenous monetary policy shocks, equation
1 is interpreted as the reaction function of the Central Bank. In addition to the orthogonality
condition, is also assumed that "st does not a®ect any variables in ­t. We measure the dynamic
response of a variable to monetary policy shock by using the coe±cients in the regression of the
variable on current as well as the lagged value of the ¯tted residuals in equation 1.
An asymptotically equivalent way of writing this procedure is ¯tting a pth order vector autore-
gressive model
Xt = A0 + A1Xt¡1 + A2Xt¡2::: + ApXt¡p + ut (2)
where Xt and ut are kx1 vectors and ut is the residual term which is serially uncorrelated and has a
variance-covariance matrix of V . Here we assume that ut is related to underlying economic shocks
"t by
ut = B"t (3)
where "t is a kx1 vector that consists of the orthogonalized residuals for k variables including "st
and we assume B is a lower triangular matrix and the variance covariance matrix of "t is diagonal.
Here we assume that St is one element of Xt vector. If St is the lth element of Xt, then ­t
includes Xit, i =1 ;:::l ¡ 1 and Xit¡1, i = l +1 ;:::p. The ordinary least square method is used
to estimate Aj's in equation 2 and once we assume B is a lower triangular matrix, we can use
V = BB0 to identify B matrix. Lastly, the impulse response functions can be computed by using
the estimates of equations 2 and 3. Here, we measure the monetary policy instrument, St is this
spread between the interbank interest rate minus the depreciation of the basket where the basket
is the combined TL value of 1 US Dollar plus 1.5 Deutsche Mark.
The vector Xt includes income (y), the logarithm of prices index (p), the logarithm of the
commodity price index in local currency (cp), the logarithm of the exchange rate basket (ex), the
spread between the interbank interest rate and the depreciation rate (spread) and the logarithm of
money (m). In this paper, three income measures are used: the logarithm of industrial production,
6the private sector capacity utilization rate and the logarithm of the number of housing permits
given by local authorities.2 The wholesale price index is used for prices. Sims (1992) notes that
central banks may use commodity prices as an indicator of in°ation when they set up their policies;
hence, commodity prices are also included in the Xt vector where the commodity price index
is the world export commodity prices in TL. The TL value of 1 USD plus 1.5 DM (basket) is
taken as the exchange rate.3 M1 + Repo is also taken as the measure of money. There are two
reasons to include Repo to money supply aggregates: (1) most of the repo was overnight hence
this money aggregate was liquid; (2) agents prefer to repo their savings rather than open deposit
accounts since the repo rates are considerably higher. The Repo/Total Demand Deposit rate was
9.54 and the Repo/Total TL Dominated Deposit excluding Repo was 0.47 in 2000:10. Hence, the
change in interest rates was more likely to a®ect repo than other components of M1. All the
data, except the world export commodity prices, are taken from the data delivery system of the
CBRT (http:nntcmbf40.tcmb.gov.tr/cbt.html), and the world export commodity prices are from
the International Monetary Fund-International Financial Statistics tape.
In order to identify the monetary policy shocks, the variables in Xt are ordered as (yt, pt, cpt,
ext, spreadt, mt). This way of ordering is consistent with our basic identifying assumption that
monetary policy setup does not have any contemporaneous e®ect on income and prices, but income
and prices do a®ect the Central Bank's policy reaction. Ordering the exchange rate before the
spread { implicitly assuming that the exchange rate will a®ect the spread but not vice versa in the
same month { is also consistent with the practice of the CBRT for the sample period we consider,
where the CBRT announces the exchange rate every morning before the ¯nancial markets open
and depreciates the local currency against the basket every day with a constant rate in each month
for the period.
It is also important to recognize that the exchange rate enters in the VAR speci¯cation twice: one
is an exchange rate, the other is the di®erence between the interbank rate and the percentage change
2Here, the capacity of utilization rate of the private sector is used rather than total capacity utilization rate because
the capacity utilization of the government is more likely determined by political decisions rather than current economic
environment. The public considers the capacity utilization rate of the private sector to be more representative of the
economic conditions than total capacity utilization (see for example, Aslanoglu, 2001).
3Commodity prices are often included to account for the supply side disturbances. Hence, we incorporate that
variable into the speci¯cation in order to make the study parallel to other studies on identi¯cation of monetary policy.
The speci¯cation that is used here allows the Turkish economy to a®ect the world commodity prices. However, Turkey
is not a major contributor to world commodity production. As a robustness test, we also excluded that variable from
the speci¯cation, but the basic conclusion of the paper did not change.
7in the exchange rate. This might be considered as a problem. Here we impose a constraint that
the di®erence between the interbank rate and the depreciation rate can be used as an indicator of
monetary policy, and we treat the interbank rate above the depreciation rate as a separate variable
from the exchange rate. Entering di®erent interest rate spreads along with their components is
also common in literature (for example Bernanke, 1990, and Friedman and Kuttner, 1992), or the
di®erence of a series along with its level (for example Bernanke, 1983).
The way that the six macroeconomic variables are ordered may incorporate extreme informa-
tion assumption { policy maker knows the current level of industrial production and prices. One
approach to avoid this is to use quarterly data. However, using quarterly data suggests that the
monetary policy shocks do not a®ect the output level in the current period, and this may not be
true either. Not allowing output level and prices to be a®ected by the current period is more rea-
sonable for the monthly data than the quarterly data. Moreover, it is more reasonable to assume
that the Central Bank sets its monetary policy monthly than quarterly. Because of the narrow
time span that the data is available, we are forced to use monthly data than the quarterly data.
However, Geweke and Runkle (1995), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1996b) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) also show that the inference they
gather with quarterly data is valid for the inferences they gather with the monthly data.
The data set used to estimate the model includes observations from 1986:05 to 2000:10. However,
when the income measure is taken as the capacity utilization rate, the data set starts from 1991:02
and when the income measure is taken as the number of housing permits given by local authorities,
then the data set starts from 1991:01. The order of VAR is one suggested by Hannan-Quinn and
Shwarz information criteria. When the regression analysis was performed, each equation had 12
monthly dummies to account for seasonal changes, 3 dummies for the 1994 ¯nancial crises: one
for the month when the crisis occurred (April 1994), one dummy before (March 1994), and one
dummy after (May 1994). Repo ¯gures are not available before November of 1995, hence a dummy
period till 1995:11 is also included. All the variables used here enter into VAR speci¯cation in
logarithmic levels except the spread where it is entered as a rate. One could argue for including
the level variables in their ¯rst di®erence or in Vector Error Correction form. Johansen ¸ ¡ trace
and ¸¡max tests reject its null of no cointegration for the system. Hence, we estimate the system
in logarithmic levels (see Sims, Stock and Watson, 1990). The lag orders of the VAR system of 3,
6, 9 and 12 are also considered. As the lag order above 6 is considered, even if it is not statistically
signi¯cant, price puzzles were present. This may mean that the results presented in this paper are
not robust against alternative speci¯cation. Alternatively, it may mean that because of the narrow
8time span, the high lag order over-speci¯ed the model.
4 The E®ect of Monetary Policy Shocks
In this section, the e®ect of monetary policy shocks on various aggregates will be analyzed. How-
ever, before moving onto this analysis the chronological stance of the monetary policy, which is
suggested by the speci¯cation that is used in this paper, will be focused on. Figure 1 plots the cu-
mulative sum of spread innovation when the industrial production is taken as the income measure.
Here, downward movements represent monetary easing, and upward movements represent mone-
tary tightness. Figure 1 suggests that, during the period from 1986:05 to 1987:12, loose monetary
policy could be observed. In that period, Turkey had a set of elections which made it likely that
the government would implement loose monetary policies [Sayan and Berument (1997) and Ergun
(2000) give the political business cycles in Turkey]. These elections are: local elections for the
empty seats in Parliament on September 28; municipality elections on June 8, 1987; the Constitu-
tional Referendum on September 8, 1987; and general elections on November 29, 1987. It is quite
likely that the Central Bank also adopted loose monetary policy on those days because of its low
independence from government (see Berument and Neyapti, 1999). The second Ä Ozal Government
got the con¯dence vote from Parliament on December 30, 1987 and this could be the date that
indicates the beginning of the tight monetary policy, which was implemented until October 1989,
except for the period that precedes the municipal elections on March 26, 1989. In mid-1989 another
municipal election was scheduled for June 1990: loose monetary policy can be seen from the graph.
After June 1990, tight monetary policy was implemented. Once Prime Minister Ä Ozal took the o±ce
of president, Mr. Mesut Y³lmaz was elected to be the leader of the Motherland Party and became
Prime Minister in June 1991. He then called an early election on November 7, 1991 and from the
¯gure loose monetary policy can easily be observed till election day. As a result of the election, Mr.
Y³lmaz lost the Prime Ministry and Mr. Demirel formed the new cabinet. Figure 1 also suggests
that tight monetary policy was implemented until April 1993 when the President Ä Ozal died and
Mr. Demirel took the o±ce of the Presidency. When Ms. C »iller became the Prime Minister on
June 13, 1993, she publicly announced that she would like to decrease interest rates to boost the
economy and loose monetary policy clearly be observed in the ¯gure till the April 5 ¯nancial crisis
in 1994.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
9A stand-by agreement was signed with the IMF in June 1994; however, the agreement was
abandoned in September 1995 due to the call for another early election. For the 1996-1997 period,
the CBRT publicly announced that the purpose of the monetary policy was to stabilize the ¯nan-
cial markets rather than control increasing in°ation. Parallel to that, Figure 1 shows the execution
of loose monetary policy till April 1997. Tight monetary policy started to be implemented after
Moody's credit rating institution decreased its grade from BA 3 to B 1 for Turkey's external debt.
When the Russian ¯nancial crisis hit in August 1998, the tight monetary policy continued till the
third quarter of 1999. After that, loose monetary policy was adopted: the CBRT loosened its mon-
etary policy after the Marmara Region Earthquake on August 17, 1999 which cost around 18,000
lives. It is interesting to note that loose monetary policy continued even with the implementation
of the exchange rate based disin°ation program after December 1999. This is what is expected from
any exchange rate based disin°ation program compared to a monetary based disin°ation program
(see Agenor and Montiel, 1999). To sum up, the identi¯ed monetary policy and the developments
of political and economic events coincide well.
In this sub-section whether the estimated impulse responses to monetary policy shocks match
with the expected movements of macroeconomic variables. First, what the economic theory suggests
will be presented; and second, how these theoretical implications match with the estimated impulse
responses to examine the validity of the proposed empirical model.
4.1 Monetary Contraction and Macroeconomic Variables
With monetary contraction, initially interest rates increase and monetary aggregates fall. However,
after the initial rise in interest rates, they may decrease due to de°ationary pressure from monetary
contraction. Next, with the monetary contraction, price level declines and the output level does not
increase. On the other hand, it is plausible that after monetary contraction, output level decreases
or price level increases. However, as long as the monetary policy is exogenous{ monetary policy
does not systematically respond to anything like in°ationary pressure, excess liquidity demand and
shocks from the rest of the world{ then output level and prices should not increase.
The system that is used here also includes world export commodity prices in domestic currency
and the exchange rate. A monetary contraction is not expected to decrease world export commodity
prices since Turkey is too small a country to in°uence commodity prices. On the other hand, under
a °exible exchange rate, it is expected that currency will appreciate in the short run with the
adoption of the tight monetary policy. Moreover, even for a small country, appreciation of the
domestic currency may decrease the world export commodity prices in terms of domestic currency.
104.2 Empirical Results
In this subsection, a set of empirical evidence on the validity of the speci¯cation being proposed
will be presented.
4.2.1 Spread as a Measure of Monetary Policy
Here, the e®ect of tight monetary policy - positive innovation in spread - will be discussed. The ¯rst
column of Figure 2 shows impulse response functions of industrial production, prices, commodity
prices, exchange rate, spread and money obtained when there is one standard deviation innovation
in spread. The middle line shows the point estimates, the other two lines show 5% con¯dence
intervals.4 Some of the observations are important to emphasize here. First, the innovation in
spread is not persistent. After the third month, the innovation in spread disappears. Second, the
e®ect of monetary policy is transitory on output but persistent in prices.
Tight monetary policy as measured with positive innovation in spread has a transitory e®ect
on output. Output level decreases for ¯rst 5 months even if this is signi¯cant in the ¯rst two
months. The rise in spread is associated with a drop in industrial production with output following
a hump-shaped pattern. This is parallel to the open economy version of the Fuhrer and Moore
model (Fuhrer and Moore, 1995a, and Fuhrer and Moore, 1995b) as presented in Walsh (1998) (pp,
472-4), and consistent with the evidence on the US (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, Sims, 1992 and
Christiano et al. 1996a). The second row of column one suggests that the tight monetary policy
permanently decreases the price level.5 This clearly eliminates the price puzzle as discussed by
Sims (1992). Tight monetary policy also permanently decreases commodity prices and exchange
rate initially { the decrease in exchange rates (appreciation of currency) presents evidence that
eliminated the exchange rate puzzle. The evidence on exchange rates is parallel to Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995), Koray and McMillin (1999) and Kim and Roubini (2000). One standard deviation
increase in spread does not persist and ends after the second month. The innovation in spread does
last only three periods and then cuts o®. This may indicate that the monetary policy of the CBRT
is not persistent. However, it may also mean that uncovered interest rate parity holds for a given
level of foreign interest rate and the CBRT cannot or does not deviate from it. This is parallel with
4These are computed by using the Monte Carlo method with 500 draws from the estimated asymptotic distribution
of the VAR speci¯cation and its covariance matrix as described by Doan (2000).
5Figure 2 suggests that with the innovation in spread, prices decrease (in a diverging way). We also calculated
the impulse responses at longer time spans, in which the decrease in price level stabilizes and is not statistically
signi¯cant after 40 months.
11what the Governor declared on April 1998. As discussed before, higher spread decreases money,
but this is not statistically signi¯cant.6
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Column 2 of Figure 2 repeats the same analysis by using the capacity utilization rate of the
private sector rather than industrial production. The results are practically parallel but decrease
in price level and decrease in exchange rate are not statistically signi¯cant after 10th month. The
last column uses the logarithm of housing permits as a measure of income. There is no qualitative
di®erence from the one when the capacity utilization is taken as a measure of income. Importantly,
parallel to the overshooting model, when capacity utilization and housing are taken as income
measures, domestic currency starts to depreciate after four months of appreciation (see, Koray and
McMillin, 1999). The same thing cannot be observed when industrial production is taken as an
income measure. Hence, the speci¯cation used in this paper to identify the monetary policy is on
a parallel with what the theory suggests and does not produce well-known puzzles.7
4.2.2 Money Aggregate as a Measure of Monetary Policy
Traditionally, monetary policy has been identi¯ed with various money aggregates like M0, M1
or M2. Earlier literature, in particular, followed that pattern (see for example Barro, 1977 and
Mishkin, 1983). In this part, we will try to identify the monetary policy by examining the implied
response functions to one standard deviation to m as reported in Figure 3. Column 1 uses the
industrial production as a measure of income. Increase in money aggregate increases the industrial
production by 24 months and it is statistically signi¯cant in the ¯rst 9 months. An increase in
money supply increases prices and decreases spread. These are parallel to the properties of the
expansionary monetary policy and also parallel to the suggestions of Figure 2. Importantly, a
decrease in spread as money increases suggests that there is no liquidity puzzle here. One may also
like to see the e®ect of the interbank interest rate with the innovation on money aggregate. The
calculated interbank interest rate (Spread + Depreciation) also suggests that there is a drop in
6We also performed the analysis by replacing spread with CBRT's overnight interbank interest rate. However,
the empirical evidence carried the price, liquidity and exchange rate puzzles discussed in the introduction section.
7The impulse response functions are also estimated for two di®erent sets of sub-samples: 1986:05-1997:12 and
1998:01-2000:10; 1986:05-1994:03 and 1994:06-2000:10. For the second period of each sub-sample, some of the puzzles
are observed. One may argue that there is sub-sample instability in the estimates. However, this set of results from
the second period of sub-samples might be due to the shortness of the sample period used in identifying the monetary
policy.
12the interbank interest rate for 2 months in a statistically signi¯cant fashion (not reported here).
On the other hand, an increase in money decreases both the commodity prices and exchange rate
persistently, and that is not what is expected by the expansionary monetary policy.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
Columns 2 and 3 repeat the analysis by using capacity utilization rate and the logarithm of
the number of housing permits as measures of income. Even if the behavior of prices, commodity
prices, spread and money are qualitatively similar. An increase in money decreases the income and
appreciates domestic currency immediately when housing is used as a measure of income. When
capacity utilization is used as a measure of income, an increase in money appreciates the currency
after the 4th month. When the innovation to money is used as a measure of the monetary policy,
we cannot say that the results are robust and give estimates on exchange rates as economic theory
suggests.
4.2.3 E®ect on Real Exchange Rate
It is also of interest to analyze the behavior of the real exchange rate with the tight monetary
policy. Following Kim and Roubini (2000), we perform VAR analyses with the real exchange rate
rather than the nominal one in order to save from degree of freedom. Both the overshooting model
(see, Dornbusch, 1976) and °exible price models with liquidity e®ects (see, for example Grilli and
Roubini, 1996) suggest that tight monetary policy is associated with a transitory drop in income
and persistent depreciation in nominal and real exchange rates after the initial appreciation. Hence,
the appreciation in the real exchange rate will be transitory and the real exchange rate will return
to its pre-shock level after all the prices are re-adjusted. Figure 4 shows how the real exchange rate
behaves with innovation in spread. The ¯gure suggests that with the positive innovation in spread,
the TL appreciates initially and the magnitude is statistically signi¯cant for the ¯rst four months
when industrial production is used as a measure of income. When capacity utilization and housing
are used as a measure of income, the real exchange rate appreciation is statistically signi¯cant for
two months.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
Figure 4 also shows that over time, prices adjust and real appreciation reverses itself to real
depreciation and the real exchange rate returns to its pre-shock level. This means that the reverting
behavior of the real exchange rate is consistent with the long-run implication of the overshooting
and the liquidity models (Koray and McMillin, 1999).
134.2.4 An Additional Puzzle: Forward Discount Biased Puzzle
If the uncovered interest rate parity holds, then an increase in the domestic interest rate should lead
to persistent depreciation rather than appreciation { forward discount biased puzzle (see, Eichen-
baum and Evans, 1995, and Kim and Roubini, 2000). After the initial appreciation period of four
moths, Figure 2 suggests that currency starts to depreciate when the income measure is capacity
utilization and housing but not for industrial production. Figure 4 suggests that real appreciation
ends and real depreciation starts after the third month for the three income measures. The em-
pirical evidence provided here suggests that \forward discount biased puzzle" is not present in the
speci¯cation used in this paper.
4.2.5 Other Money Aggregates
Here M1 plus Repo were used as money aggregates. It might be necessary to use broader money
aggregates. Hence M2 plus Repo (M2R) is also used as a money aggregate. The evidence is also
robust. Increase in spread decreases income temporarily but decreases prices and exchange rates
permanently. However, the increase in spread tends to increase M2R rather than decrease it. (These
results and the results on the other impulse response functions from now on are not reported but
available from the author upon request).
4.2.6 Excluding Commodity Prices from the Information Set
Sims (1992) suggested including the commodity prices to VAR setting in order to account for the
price puzzle. He also notes that prices tend to increase after a measure of contraction. The reason
for this is that the information set based on ­t did not include information about future in°ation,
whereas this information could be available to policy makers. In other words, the information set
that is an indicator of future in°ation but not a policy variable might be missing. Sims (1992),
Christiano et al. (1996b) and Sims and Zha (1996) show that including the current and past values
of commodity prices often eliminates the price puzzle.
In this paper, the commodity prices are also excluded from the VAR setting. When the com-
modity prices are excluded the price puzzle could not be observed in either of the cases which
use di®erent measures of income. Hence, one may argue that a six variable VAR model might be
overspecifying the system. However, the reason for not observing the price puzzle could be that
the volatility of commodity prices is high due to exchange rate volatility rather than a change in
the relative prices of inputs. Another reason for having a high level of in°ation for the period
14that is considered, could be that the e®ect of an increase in commodity prices does not provide
enough volatility to observe the price puzzle. Kibritcioglu and Kibritcioglu (1999) and Berument
and Tasci (2000) show that a 20% increase in oil prices increases the price level by 1.4%. Hence,
the commodity prices were retained in the VAR speci¯cation as the sixth variable.
4.2.7 The E®ect of the Rest of the World
Turkey is a small open economy. Therefore, the state of the economy can be a®ected by policies in
the rest of the world. Sims (1992) argues that shocks to foreign monetary policy are captured better
with the orthogonalized shocks to foreign interest rates rather than with the orthogonalized shocks
to money aggregates. Hence, the Federal Funds Rate is included in the VAR setting as the ¯rst
variable. The empirical evidence suggests that Federal Funds Rate is not a®ected by the aggregates
of the Turkish economy. This also is consistent with the small open economy assumption of Turkey.
Moreover, the e®ects of Turkish Monetary Policy on macroeconomic variables are virtually identical
to the one reported in Figure 2. This is parallel to Kim (1999). The author is not aware if there is any
single empirical study which assesses the e®ects of a tight monetary policy on a country's domestic
interest rate, output and prices simultaneously. However, the predictions of our speci¯cations
are not always at odds with the literature. Here, positive innovation in the Federal Funds Rate
decreases output (consistent with Kim, 2001), increases prices initially when capacity utilization
and housing are used as income measures and appreciates the domestic currency. Lastly, spread
increases (consistent with Cushman and Zha, 1997 and Kim and Roubini, 2000) and serves to
increase money aggregates. Most of our results are parallel to the empirical evidence prior but on
exchange rate.
4.2.8 Impulses With Re-ordered Variables
Christiano et al. (1996b) discuss the importance of the ordering of the variables in the VAR setting.
If income, prices, commodity prices and exchange rates precede the spread, then this type of
ordering imposes the extreme information assumption; the CBRT observes these variables at the
current time period before it sets the spread. The spread is also used as the ¯rst variable when
the monetary policy of the CBRT a®ects all those variables at the current period. The empirical
evidence is still robust. However, as the lag order is increased the price puzzle is observed. Hence,
it is not necessary to change the basic speci¯cation scheme.
154.2.9 Evidence from Forecast Variance Decomposition
The impulse response functions assess the dynamic e®ects of monetary policy shocks. On the
other hand, the forecast error variance decomposition analysis assesses how the monetary policy
shocks contribute to the volatility of various economic aggregates. There are two reasons for the
importance of the latter. First, it helps to assess whether monetary policy shocks have been an
important independent source of impulses to the business cycles. Second, it helps the identi¯cation
strategy, which assumes that monetary aggregates are mostly exogenous shocks to money.
[Insert Figure 5 Here.]
[Insert Figure 6 Here.]
Figures 5 and 6 report the percentage of variance in the ¯rst 36 step-ahead forecast errors vari-
ance in income, prices, commodity prices, exchange rate, spread and money which are attributable
to spread and money, respectively.
It is ¯rst necessary to assess the impact of monetary policy (spread). Regarding the e®ect
of monetary policy on income, it has a statistically signi¯cant impact on industrial production
and housing but not on capacity utilization, However, these all have small magnitude: Monetary
policy shocks are not the dominant source of income °uctuations, which is parallel to Kim (1999)
and Kim and Roubini (2000). For the three income measures considered, there is no statistically
signi¯cant variation of prices accounted for by the spread. Importantly, a big variation of spread
is also explained by itself. This supports the identi¯cation strategy, which assumes that spread is
exogenous and not explained by prices and output.
Second, the results that are obtained for money are considered in Figure 6. This is statistically
signi¯cant that a small fraction of variability on income is accounted for by money. However, an
important fraction of prices can be accounted for by money. As forecast steps increase, the size
of explanatory fractions stabilizes. In addition, a big fraction of money is explained by money
itself. However, as the time horizons increase, this fraction decreases. In brief, the volatility of
income is more likely to be attributable to money aggregate than the spread, and money is more
likely to a®ect prices than output. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that even if monetary
policy shocks have played a small role in income and prices, it does not mean that the systematic
component of monetary policy shocks played a small role.
Although the speci¯cation used in this paper addresses a number of the above puzzles, there
are some limitations. Firstly, the recursive structure imposed here is unrealistic { the Central Bank
16is unlikely to know what the industrial production and prices in the current period will be { it is
likely that the Turkish economy is less recursive. Secondly, there is still limited evidence on the
forward discount bias puzzle. Lastly, as the lag order of the VAR system increases above 6, even if
it is not statistically signi¯cant, price puzzle is present.
An alternative approach to be followed in order to identify the monetary policy is to impose
spread as an identifying assumption within structural VAR framework. This would allow the e®ect
of interbank interest rates on the macroeconomic performance to be observed.8 An attempt has
been made to impose that constraint and estimate the model. When the constraints are imposed,
the impulse response functions were not robust. The casual observation of the likelihood function
suggests that a possible reason for unrobustness was that local maximums were captured instead
of the global maximum.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, a measure of monetary policy for a small open economy is introduced to address a
number of empirical anomalies about the e®ect of monetary policy in a small open economy. A
recursive identi¯cation scheme is used to (1) identify monetary shocks successfully, and (2) solve
puzzles and anomalies in regard to the e®ect of monetary policy.
For the four puzzles addressed here, innovation in money aggregate seems to decrease the
di®erence between the interbank interest rate and the depreciation rate (spread): there is no liquidly
puzzle. A positive innovation in spread decreases prices: there is no price puzzle. Domestic currency
appreciates with a tight monetary policy: there is no evidence of exchange rate puzzle. Lastly, after
the initial appreciation, currency depreciates in real terms with a tight monetary policy: there is
some support for the no forward discount biased puzzle.
The recursive system that we used in this paper produced impulse response functions that are
not inconsistent with widely accepted views on the qualitative impact of a monetary policy shock
on various macroeconomic variables. The absence of the four puzzles discussed above also suggests
that the proposed macroeconomic variable used here as an indicator of monetary policy and the
recursive identi¯cation scheme are not at odds with economic theories.
Tight monetary policy has a transitory e®ect on output; output falls for a short period of time
in a statistically signi¯cant fashion. Having eliminated the exchange rate puzzle, the model given
8See, for example Cushman and Zha (1997). They imposed real demand function as the identifying assumption
where one could impose spread instead.
17here distinguishes the Fisherian e®ect of interest rates from the tight monetary policy indicator.
Here, the qualitative inferences on the e®ect of monetary policy are on a parallel with the di®erent
speci¯cation models used in previous studies (See, Sims, 1992, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995, Grilli
and Roubini, 1995, and Kim and Roubini, 2000).
This paper imposes additional importance on the identi¯cation of monetary policy for a small
open economy. Policy makers from small open economies have additional challenges that are
not present in developed economies like the threat of currency substitution or the level of foreign
exchange rate reserves. Hence, identifying the spread as the indicator of monetary policy for Turkey
suggests the interesting possibility that the same variable could be used as an indicator of monetary
policy for other small open economies.
There are several issues which are not addressed here. Inclusion of ¯scal policy could produce
a more complete picture of the behavior of prices and output. There are some periods when the
CBRT used money aggregate targeting (January 1998-June 1998) and periods that targeted Net
Domestic Assets (July 1998-November 2000). Furthermore, the behavior of the Foreign Reserves
of the CBRT is not modeled. The level and behavior of foreign exchange reserves are important
and closely monitored by the public and the CBRT. These are the areas to be dealt within future
research.








































































19Figure 2: E®ects of Spread.
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20Figure 3: E®ects of Money.
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21Figure 4: E®ects of Spread on Real Exchange Rates.
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22Figure 5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Spread.
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23Figure 6: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Money.
Industrial Production Capacity Utilization Housing
y
FEV OF M DUE TO Y
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO CU_PRI
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO HOUSE
SIZE=  5%







FEV OF M DUE TO P
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO P
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO P
SIZE=  5%







FEV OF M DUE TO CP
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO CP
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO CP
SIZE=  5%







FEV OF M DUE TO EX
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO EX
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO EX
SIZE=  5%







FEV OF M DUE TO SPREAD
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO SPREAD
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO SPREAD
SIZE=  5%







FEV OF M DUE TO M
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO M
SIZE=  5%






FEV OF M DUE TO M
SIZE=  5%







Agenor, Pierre-Richard and Peter Montiel, Development Macroeconomics, Second Edition,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Aslanoglu, Erhan, \Shrincage in Economy (in Turkish),"
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/79366.asp?0m=S141 2001.
Barro, Robert J., \Unanticipated Money Growth and Unemployment in the United States,"
American Economic Review, 1977, 67(2), 101{115.
Bernanke, Ben, \Nonmonetary E®ects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great
Depression," American Economic Review, 1983, 73(3), 257{276.
, \On the Predictive Power of Interest Rates and Interest Rate Spreads," New England Eco-
nomic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1990, pp. 51{68.
and Alan Blinder, \Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary Transmission,"
American Economic Review, 1992, 82(4), 901{921.
and Ilian Mihov, \Measuring Monetary Policy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998,
113(3), 869{902.
Berument, Hakan and Bilin Neyapti, \How Independent is the Central Bank of the Republic
of Turkey (in Turkish)," Iktisat, Isletme ve Finans, 1999, pp. 11{17.
and Hakan Tasci, \In°ationary E®ect of Crude Oil Prices in Turkey," mimeo 2000.
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans, \The E®ect of Mone-
tary Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Flow of Funds," Review of Economics and Statistics,
1996, pp. 16{34.
, , and , \Implication and the E®ects of Monetary Policy Shocks," in Mario Blejer,
ed., Financial Factors in Economic Stabilization and Growth, London/New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
, , and , \Monetary Policy Shocks: What Have we Learned and to What End?,"
in John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics Volume 1A,
Amsterdam/Netherlands: Elsevier Science, 1999.
Cushman, David O. and Tao Zha, \Identifying Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy
under Flexible Exchange Rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, 1997, 39, 433{448.
Doan, Thomas A., RATS Version 5, Cambridge, MA: Estima, 2000.
Dornbusch, R., \Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics," Journal of Political Economy,
1976, 84, 1161{1176.
Eichenbaum, Martin and Charles L. Evans, \Some Empirical Evidence on the E®ect of
Shock to Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995, 110,
975{1009.
Ergun, Mine, \Electoral Political Business Cycles in Turkey," Russian and East European Finance
and Trade Journal, 2000, 36(6), 6{32.
25Friedman, Benjamin M. and Kenneth N. Kuttner, \Money, Income, Prices and Interest
Rates," American Economic Review, 1992, 82(3), 472{492.
Fuhrer, J.C. and G.R. Moore, \In°ation Persistence," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995,
110(1), 127{159.
and , \Monetary Policy Trade-o®s and the Correlation Between Nominal Interest Rates
and Real Output," American Economic Review, 1995, 85(1), 219{239.
Geweke, J.F. and D.E. Runkle, \A Fine Time for Monetary Policy?," Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 1995, 19(1), 18{31.
Grilli, V and N. Roubini, \Liquidity and Exchange Rates: Puzzling Evidence from the G-7
Countries," Working Paper, Yale University, CT 1995.
and , \Liquidity models in Open Economies: Theory and Empirical Evidence," European
Economic Review, 1996, 40, 847{859.
Kibritcioglu, A. and B. Kibritcioglu, \In°ationary E®ect of Crude Oil Prices," mimeo 1999.
Kim, Soyoung, \Do Monetary Policy Shock Matter in the G-7 Countries? Using Common Iden-
tifying Assumptions About Monetary Policy Across Countries," Journal of International Eco-
nomics, 1999, 48, 387{412.
, \International Transmission of U.S. Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from VAR s," Journal
of Monetary Economics, 2001, forthcoming.
and Nouriel Roubini, \Exchange Rate Anomalies in Industrial Countries: A Solution with
a Structural VAR Approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, 2000, 45, 561{86.
Koray, Faik and W. Douglas McMillin, \Monetary Shocks, the Exchage Rate, and the Trade
Balance," Journal of International Money and Finance, 1999, 18, 925{940.
Leeper, Eric M. and David B. Gordon, \In Search of the Liquidity E®ect," Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, 1992, 29, 341{369.
Litterman, R.B. and L. Weiss, \Money, Interest Rates, and Output: A Reinterpretation of
Postwar US Data," Econometrica, 1985, 53, 129{156.
Mishkin, F.S., A Rational Expectation Approach to Testing Macroeconomics: Testing Policy
Ine®ectiveness and E±cient-Market Models, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1983.
Pool, W., \Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instrument in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 84(2), 197{216.
Sayan, Serdar and Hakan Berument, \Politics in Turkey, Economic Populism and Govern-
ments (in Turkish)," H.U. Iktisadi ve Idari Bilimler Fakultesi Dergisi, 1997, 15(2), 171{185.
Sims, Christopher, \Comparison of Interwar and Postwar Business Cycles: Monetarism Recon-
sidered," American Economic Review Papers and Procedings, 1980, 70, 250{257.
, \Interpreting the Macroeconomic Time Series Facts," European Economic Review, 1992, 36,
975{1011.
and Tao Zha, \Does Monetary Policy Generate Recession?," mimeo 1996.
26, James H. Stock, and Mark W. Watson, \Inference in Linear Time Series Models with
Some Unit Roots," Econometrica, 1990, 58(1), 113{144.
Walsh, Carl E., Monetary Theory and Policy, Armonk, NY: MIT Press, 1998.
27Please disregard this page
Leeper and Gordon (1992) Sims (1980) and Litterman and Weiss (1985) Sims (1992) Grilli and Roubini (1995)
Aslanoglu (2001) Bernanke (1990) and Friedman and Kuttner (1992) Bernanke (1983) Eichenbaum and Evans (1995)
and Kim and Roubini (2000) Sims, Stock and Watson (1990) Berument and Neyapti (1999) Agenor and Montiel
(1999) Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995b) Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Sims (1992) and
Christiano et al. (1996a) Koray and McMillin (1999) Barro (1977) and Mishkin (1983) Dornbusch (1976) Grilli and
Roubini (1996) Kim (2001) Cushman and Zha (1997) and Kim and Roubini (2000) Sims (1992), Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995), Grilli and Roubini (1995) and Kim and Roubini (2000)).